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Equitable Limitations On The Power To
Amend Articles Of Incorporation
MICHAEL J. HALLORAN*
Once a corporation is organized, a change in its needs may re-
quire an amendment of its articles of incorporation. While
the statutory powers to effect such an amendment are broad, they
are governed by equitable limitations. In this article, Mr. Halloran
presents and analyzes California's test for granting equitable relief,
which he characterizes as a balancing of fairness factors. The
author then concludes that in view of applicable case law and De-
partment of Corporations administrative proceedings, in which the
equitable factors have been successfully applied, statutory revision
in this area is unnecessary at this time.
INTRODUCTION
As corporations attempt to adjust to the rapid changes in the busi-
ness world, their financial and operational needs may be altered ac-
cordingly. These changes in need may dictate an adjustment in stock
structure, in rights or restrictions on outstanding shares, or in corpo-
rate powers or purposes. In order to effect these changes, an amend-
ment of the articles of incorporation may be required. However, the
power given by the California Corporations Code' to the board of di-
rectors and the holders of the majority of the outstanding shares to
* Member, State Bar of California; B.S., University of California, Berkeley,
1962; LLB, University of California, Berkeley, 1965; Member, Committee on Corpora-
tions of State Bar of California.
1. CAL. CoRp. CoDE §§3600-3604.
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amend the articles is restricted by judicially and administratively im-
posed equitable limitations.
These equitable limitations upon the power to amend the articles of
incorporation are the subject of this article. Initially, California's pur-
ported acceptance of the Ballantine test for granting equitable relief is
discussed. Thereafter, the actual test that California appears to be us-
ing is presented in the format of a checklist of fairness factors, which
are analyzed and evaluated.
Equitable limitations on the power to amend articles derive from
the inherent power of a court of equity to grant injunctive relief in
situations where the majority shareholders have acted unfairly toward
the minority shareholders.' Equitable limitations have been recognized
by the California courts, 3 but the courts have had difficulty in pinpoint-
ing a precise, workable "test" to determine when equitable relief should
be granted.
The California test adopted from Ballantine is said to be the follow-
ing:
Changes in the rights of outstanding shares may be valid if they
can be justified as an exercise of fair business discretion in meet-
ing the needs and exigencies of the corporate enterprise. The
more urgent the need or the emergency the more drastic the
amendment or adjustment which fairness will permit. ....,
Under the Ballantine test the burden is upon the proponents of the
change (usually the management) to demonstrate (1) the business
need or exigency requiring the change, (2) the fact that the amend-
ment would appear to meet, or help to meet, the need or exigency, and
(3) the fact that adoption of the amendment would appear to be an
exercise of fair business discretion in meeting such need.5 This alloca-
tion of the burden of proof appears to be recognized in DeMello v.
Dairyman's Co-op Creamery.6 In DeMello, the court reviewed evi-
dence which indicated that the membership structure of a cooperative
2. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 953 (3d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1944); Goldman v. Postal Tel. Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763, 768
(D. Del. 1943); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 262
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
3. DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-op Creamery, 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 751, 167
P.2d 226, 228 (1946); Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18,
85 P.2d 580, 584 (1938).
4. DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-op Creamery, 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 751, 167 P.2d
226, 228 (1946), quoting from what is now 2 H. BALr.. 'nm & G. SlTRLIUN, CAU-
FORNA CORPOATrON LAws §295 (4th ed. 1962).
5. The exercise of fair business discretion is determined by weighing the degree
of need for the amendment against the degree of change wrought by the amendment.
In other words, the lower the business need, the more difficult it will be to establish
'fair business discretion" in adopting the amendment.
6. 73 Cal. App. 2d at 751, 167 P.2d at 228-29; accord, Honigman v. Green
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resulted in dissension, hampered operations, caused unnecessary pay-
ment of taxes, and prevented repayment to dissenting members of the
full value of their interest unless dissolution proceedings were com-
menced. The court also noted that all members were treated alike by
the relevant amendment to the articles. It then concluded, "There
seems to be nothing unfair in this procedure and it is intended to settle
the internal troubles of the association. This brings the case within
the rule announced by Mr. Ballantine ....
Various tests to determine when equitable relief should be granted
have been developed in other jurisdictions." In view of the sparsity of
the law in this area in California, these tests might be argued in judi-
cial and administrative litigation in California. An attempt to induce
federal courts to use their own unfairness test and not to use the state
law tests has failed.'
Although the case did not involve an amendment to the articles, it is
possible that the "fair, just and equitable" standard adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.10 (a
pure fairness standard) might apply in future article amendment cases.
In support of this proposition it has been argued that the same princi-
ples should govern the exercise of the power to amend the articles of
incorporation as govern the exercise of the power to engage in a trans-
action where control is material, as was the case in Jones v. H.F. Ah-
manson & Co." The better view is that there is a "spectrum" of fidu-
ciary duties owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders
Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1962); contra as to burden of proof: All
Delaware case authority, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 201
(D. Del. 1943), af'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944). See Note, Freezing Out Mi-
nority Shareholders, 74 HA-v. L. REv. 1630, 1637 (1961).
7. 73 Cal. App. 2d at 751, 167 P.2d at 229.
8. McNulty v. W.&J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(good faith). Delaware courts require evidence of "fraud," see Aldridge v. Franco
Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A.2d 380 (Sup. CL 1940); Davis v. Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (Ct. Ch. 1928), or "bad faith," see
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ct. Ch. 1943). New
Jersey appears to have adopted a test which is close to a pure fairness standard, see
Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J. Super. 534, 83 A.2d 649, 652 (Super. Ct. 1951); Kamena
v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200, 202 (Ct. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 134
N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1944) ("shocks the conscience of the court"; "a
question of fair dealing"). Iowa may have a pure fairness standard, State v. Bechtel,
31 N.W.2d 853, 860 (Iowa 1948) ("unjust, unfair and inequitable").
9. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Del. 1943)
("questions of fairness are matters of substantive law"). This decision makes it clear
that the shareholder would have been granted relief if the court applied its own fair-
ness test. The anti-forum-shopping policy evinced in the most recent United States
Supreme Court decision in the federal-state law conflict area suggests the result today
would be the same as the holding in Barrett, Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
10. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 110, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599, 601
(1969).
11. Comment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minor-
ity Shareholders, 9 HAST. L.J. 306 at n.2 (1958) (article cited by Jones v. H.F. Ahman-
son & Co., 1 Cal. 3d at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602). Article amendments
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and that the standard of duty required in the case of a transaction
where control is material is not as demanding a standard as that which
exists in the case of the statutory majority of the shareholders adopting
an article amendment.
12
Analysis of the Standard
Although more workable than the other tests that have been uti-
lized, the Ballantine test is, in the opinion of the author, somewhat too
generalized. A review of the relevant cases reveals that the Ballantine
test includes within it some, but not all, of the factors considered by
courts in deciding whether to exercise their equitable powers. In con-
trast to this general test, an old law review article, written at a time
when the "vested rights" doctrine appeared to be the "prevailing rule
in the United States," opined that the courts will balance the impor-
tance of the right destroyed against the advantage of the change and
will discover a vested right when the former overbalances the latter.'"
It is submitted that this is still the standard except that the courts and
administrative agencies are now less inclined to speak in terms of a
vested right and are more inclined simply to find the amendment in-
equitable to the minority.' 4
which would result in "any change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of
or on outstanding securities . . . by the issuer with its existing security holders" may re-
quire qualification with the Department of Corporations of the securities before the
"offer" is made either at the shareholders meeting at which the vote on the amend-
ment is taken or in proxy soliciting material directed to shareholders [California Cor-
porations Code §251201. The Commissioner of Corporations may refuse to issue a
permit qualifying the securities "unless he finds that the proposed plan of recapitali-
zation or reorganization and the proposed issuance of securities are fair, just and
equitable to all security holders affected" [California Corporations Code §25140(c)].
To the extent article amendments require qualification by the Department, the Ballan-
tine and other judicial "tests" become somewhat irrelevant because of the statutory test
of "fair, just and equitable." However, the application by the administrative agency of
its statutory test is important to corporations planning an article amendment, and this
article attempts to set forth the method of application utilized by the Department. In
addition, many securities and transactions are exempt from the qualification require-
ments, e.g., New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange listed securities
[California Corporations Code §25100(o)], so that the variety of "tests" used by
courts becomes relevant because the courts will be the only reviewing agency. Accord-
ingly, this article also sets forth the method of judging amendments now used by many
courts, which appears to be similar to that of the Department of Corporations. See text
at note 15 et seq.
12. Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HAiv. L. REv. 1630, 1636
(1961).
13. Note, Equitable and Constitutional Limitations on the Reserved Power to
Amend Corporate Charters, 23 VA. L. Rav. 579 (1937).
14. Litigation in this area inevitably dredges up the "vested rights" doctrine
and other alleged constitutional limitations on the amending power and a brief reference
to them is appropriate. The vested rights doctrine is really an aspect of the constitu-
tional limitation regarding the taking (without consent of the holder by contract or
otherwise) of property without just compensation, see N. LA=TIN, THE LAwv
OF CoroRIONs 498-507 (1959 ed.). Notwithstanding the fact that most states,
including California, have adopted reserved power clauses permitting the legis-
lature, either by legislative enactment' or by action of a specified majority of
the shareholders pursuant to a legislative authorization, to amend articles of incorpora-
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The judicial balancing indicated above is accomplished by review-
ing several competing factors which will be discussed below. Similar
tion, thus effectively eliminating the argument that an article amendment "impairs the
contractual obligations of shareholders," several cases throughout the country never-
theless regard the reserved power as still limited to changing, altering, or repealing
"non-vested" rights. These cases have ostensibly classified various types of rights as"vested" property rights which cannot be taken away without just compensation, and
therefore, which are not amendable without unanimous consent of the shareholders.
However, a review of the cases reveals that the prevailing view of "vested rights"
courts is that if the statute specifically authorizes the amendment of that particular
right, there is not a vested right. Conversely, if the statute is generally worded
(as, for example, Section 3602(b) of the California Corporations Code) the vested
rights doctrine may have some use. The apparent basis for this rationale is that a spe-
cific statute makes it clear that the amendment is authorized by the shareholder's con-
tract (which includes the statute), and therefore, the right cannot be vested because
the shareholder has consented in advance to the taking of his property. Since the
California amendment statute is among the most specific of all the states (see Sec-
tions 3600 through 3602 of the California Corporations Code), the vested rights doc-
trine has appeared less and has been rejected more in our case law than in the case
law of some other states. The doctrine is not completely dead, however, for its was
used successfully in the trial court and the court of appeal by the plaintiff shareholder
in Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1964) (adoption by majority of right-of-first-refusal restriction on previously unre-
stricted shares, pursuant to rather specific statutory authority in Section 501(g) of the
California Corporations Code). The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court
opinion and quickly disposed of the vested right argument by reference to the reserved
power which, it said, formed a part of the contract between the shareholder and the
corporation and allowed the corporation to alter the shareolder's contract "pursuant to
statutory authority," Tu-Vu, 61 Cal. 2d at 288, 391 P.2d at 381, 38 Cal. Rptr. at
351. One may take two views of this case depending upon whose counsel one is.
First, the vested rights doctrine does not exist as a doctrine separate from the impair-
ment of contract obligations limitation, and since the impairment of contract obli-
gations limitation has been effectively eliminated by the reserved power, the California
Supreme Court will simply refer to the reserved power in answer to any vested rights ar-
gument by a shareholder. The second view is that the vested rights doctrine does exist
in California, but was rejected by the Supreme Court in Tu-Vu simply because there
was specific statutory authority for the amendment in Section 501(g) of the Corpora-
tions Code. Whichever is the correct view, the Tu-Vu decision will figure prominently
in future vested rights litigation in this area. It submitted that the trend is away from
the vested rights doctrine and toward the position that the question is simply one of
statutory construction (does the statute authorize this particular amendment?) with
an overall equitable limitation against using the statutory authority in an oppressive,
fraudulent or unfair manner. See generally Lynch, The Majority's Power to Effect
Fundamental Changes in Shareholder Rights, 2 CoRP. PRAc. COM. No. 4, at 1, 18-25
(1961). A leading case for this position is Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co., 124
Cal. App. 2d 276, 279, 268 P.2d 510, 512 (1954) (". . . the problem is not as to whether
'vested' rights or the 'fundamental nature' of the corporation will be affected, but
whether or not the amendment falls within the scope of the applicable statute ...
[Tihe proposed amendment . . . is expressly authorized by law... . The amend-
ment appears to be an attempt to alleviate what was an apparent failure of the plan to
combine management with an employee-shareholder arrangement. It necessarily fol-
lows that said proposed amendment is not such a change as is prohibited either in law
or in equity") (emphasis added). Those California decisions which have invalidated
corporate acts on the basis of the vested rights doctrine appear to have been overruled
or may possibly be distinguished. The appellate court decision in Tu-Vu (34 Cal. Rptr.
622) was vacated. This opinion relied in part on Bornstein v. Dist. Grand Lodge No. 4,
2 Cal. App. 624, 84 P. 271 (1906), and Casady v. Modem Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co.,
188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961). Bornstein could probably be limited to
a situation where the shareholder was suing in a different capacity, namely, as a holder
of a contract (here, a contract of insurance); this "dual character" of his relationship
was noted by the court and given as a basis for its decision (2 Cal. App. at 628-30,
84 P. at 272-73). However, the attempt to so limit the doctrine failed in Casady. It is
submitted that Casady and other vested rights decisions cited and purportedly followed
by it may have been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Tu-Vu (see
footnote 5 in Tu-Vu distinguishing Bornstein). See generally McNulty, Corporations
and the Intertemporal Conflict of Laws, 55 CALiF. L. Rnv. 12, 24-40 (1967).
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factors are considered by the California Commissioner of Corporations
in determining whether to issue a permit authorizing an amendment"
and by courts reviewing a decision of the Commissioner. Thus, the at-
torney for a corporation that is contemplating an article amendment in
order to satisfy some corporate problem or need should consider these
factors and recommend to his client the type of amendment most likely
to both satisfy the corporate need and survive eventual scrutiny by
the Commissioner or the reviewing court. Counsel should draft the
amendment in such a way that he can argue the factors in his favor in
the event of litigation. Conversely, the attorney for an objecting share-
holder, with the following fairness factors in mind, should analyze the
amendment, the business conditions of the corporation, and the rights
to which his shareholder client will be deprived, so that he can deter-
mine whether an attack heard before the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions or the courts is likely to succeed.
THE TEST FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
Corporate Necessity
An article amendment must be justified by some corporate necessity
in terms of a business need or exigency. This is basically the Ballan-
tine test adopted by the court in DeMello'8 and has been utilized in
many instances in California. For example, the fact that a corporation
was in serious financial difficulties and was facing probable bankruptcy
and dissolution justified the elimination of accrued dividends on pre-
ferred stock.1 7  In another case, the protection of a close corporation
and its shareholders against unwanted intrusions by outsiders justified
a reasonable restriction on transfer of outstanding shares.18 Further,
another corporation in financial reorganization proceedings justified
an amendment to its articles, removing restrictions on selling additional
shares, presumably for the purpose of raising new capital.' 9 An amend-
ment was allowed by the court (overruling a decision of the Commis-
sioner of Corporations not to permit the amendment) in a case in
which an unsuccessful business sought recapitalization to avoid the sale
15. Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California Recapitali.
zations, 4 STAN. L. Rav. 215 (1952).
16. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
17. Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18, 85 P.2d
580, 584 (1938) (so-called "voluntary" exchange plan accomplished same result as
amendment of articles directly removing accrued dividends).
18. Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1964).
19. Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 276, 268 P.2d 510
(1954). See also Heller Inv. Co. v. Southern T.&T. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 202, 203, 61
P.2d 807, 808 (1936) (capital was impaired and in order to continue in business
new capital was needed).
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of its sole asset.20 The asset was in a state of disrepair and decay as a
result of payment of dividends out of capital to the preferred stock.21
Other cases outside of California have evinced a similar attitude in
judging article amendments."
Discrimination Among or Disproportionate Treatment of Classes or
Groups of Shareholders
The courts have shown considerable interest in whether or not a
proposed amendment treats all shareholders alike, or whether there is
a different treatment of groups or classes of shareholders evidencing
personal gain to the majority at the expense of the minority.2 3  For ex-
ample, a lack of corporate need or business purpose for the article
amendment together with discrimination among groups of sharehold-
ers has supported the conclusion that the only purpose of the amend-
ment was to discriminate against the minority. 24 On the other hand,
in cases in which an article amendment involves a recapitalization fol-
lowed by issuance of additional shares (authorized by the recapitali-
zation) in order to raise new capital, the giving to each shareholder of
20. Transportation Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty, 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 169 P.2d 470
(1946).
21. Id.
22. King v. Ligon, 180 S.C. 224, 185 S.E. 305 (1936) (banks required amend-
ment eliminating redemption provision as a condition of nonforeclosure of loans);
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (CL Ch. 1928) (busi-
ness was prosperous, but was growing and in need of additional funds for expansion,
which could be best obtained by sale of a class of stock with a higher dividend parti-
cipation and with no redemption provision); Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery
Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943) (business prosperous, but needed refinancing);
Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944) (possible expansion
could be more easily effectuated if capital structure were simplified); see generally
Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L.
Rev. 1, 10 (1942); Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California
Recapitalizations, supra note 15, at 230 et seq.
23. See DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-op Creamery, 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 751, 167
P.2d 226, 228 (1946) ("all members were treated alike"); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson
& Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 (1969) (any use
to which majority puts the power of control "must benefit all shareholders propor-
tionately"). See also Page v. American & British Mfg. Co., 129 App. Div. 346, 113
N.Y.S. 734 (1908), where the corporation had two classes of outstanding shares,
8,000 common and 20,000 preferred with a dividend and liquidation preference. The
number of common shares was reduced to 2,000 and the number of preferred shares
was left intact. The court stated that the reduction should have been borne equally
by both classes, regardless of the liquidation preference of the preferred shares, unless
there was an express statutory provision authorizing reduction of one class but not
another. It is possible that this case may be distinguished on the ground the New
York statute was not sufficiently specific as to reduction of one class but not an-
other. The California statute would seem to be sufficiently specific, see Sections
3601(a) and 1905 (c) of the California Corporations Code. It is equally possible,
and more probable, that the case demonstrates a strong judicial attitude against dis-
proportionate reduction of the common stock's voting power. In Kennedy v. Carolina
Public Service Co., 262 F. 803 (N.D. Ga. 1920), a reduction of preferred stock by
two-fifths and common stock by one-fifth was held invalid. See also Strathmore
Irrigation Dist. v. Wutchumna Water Co., 111 Cal. App. 688, 701, 296 P. 933, 937-
38 (1931), and Note, Intraclass Discrimination in the Elimination of Accrued Divi-
dends, 55 HAnv. L. REv. 1196 (1942).
24. Browning v. C.&C. Plywood Corp., 248 Ore. 574, 434 P.2d 339, 342-43
(1967).
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the right to purchase his portion of the additionally issued shares (in
effect, a "pre-emptive right") has helped to eliminate judicial and ad-
ministrative objections, at least where the price for the additionally is-
sued shares has not been grossly unfair.25
The Size of the Objectors
20
The courts and administrative agencies tend to be very practical in
this area; when the vote in favor of the amendment is overwhelming,
or at least when the objecting minority owns a very small amount of
the outstanding shares, this factor will weigh heavily in favor of sup-
porting the amendment.2 7  In fact, obtaining the statutorily required
vote and having only a small minority objector group are together not
only given "great weight" by the courts, but result in a "presumption
that the judgment of the governing body of a corporation, whether at
the time it consists of directors or majority shareholders, is formed in
good faith and inspired by a bona fides of purpose. '28  In the admii-
istrative context, the Department of Corporations also takes careful
note of the shareholder vote on any controversial amendment of arti-
cles subject to its jurisdiction which effects a change in the rights, pref-
erences, and privileges of, or restrictions on, outstanding securities.
Since a permit must be obtained from the Department of Corporations
in advance of the shareholder meeting, the Department of Corporations
may in some circumstances grant a permit on the condition that speci-
fied vote percentages are obtained at the meeting.29
25. Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951); see also
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hewitt, 94 NJ. Eq. 65, 118 A. 267 (Ct. Ch. 1922), aff'd,
94 N.J. Eq. 187, 118 A. 926 (Ct. App. 1922); Browning v. C.&C. Plywood
Corp., 248 Ore. 574, 434 P.2d 339 (1967); See also In re Pacific Mariculture Inc., Cal.
Dep't of Corp. File No. SF500 2764; such a pre-emptive right does not, however, allow
issuance of shares at a grossly inadequate price, Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99
A.2d 236, 240 (Del. Ch. 1953); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d
350 (1951) (substantial dilution of book value).
26. This factor can be more precisely stated as: the size of the negative vote plus
a presumption that the majority voting for the amendment acted fairly.
27. See Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 85 P.2d 580
(1938), where the holders of 90% of the preferred shares and the holders of 97% of the
common shares approved the action; Heller Inv. Co. v. Southern T.&T. Co., 17 Cal.
App. 2d 202, 61 P.2d 807 (1936), where there were 3,374 shares for the amendment
and several shareholders holding 697 shares who were against it but by the time of
trial plaintiff was the only objector; Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Il. 260,
85 N.E.2d 722 (1949), where 97% of preferred voted for elimination of its accrued
dividends.
28. Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Ct. Ch.
1943). In Transportation Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty, 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 613-14, 169
P.2d 470, 476 (1946), the court noted, (a) the lack of any opposition at the hearing
before the Commissioner of Corporations on the proposed amendment, (b) a "pre-
sumption of fair dealing ...should control unless it is overcome by contrary evi-
dence," and (c) "that a two-thirds class vote on the amendment was required." See
also Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (Ct. Ch. 1928)
(holder of 90% of class adversely affected voted for the action; court applied presump-
tion of good faith in upholding the amendment).
29. See note 30 infra.
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The fact that a high percentage of the vote was in favor of an
amendment may be discounted in determining what, if any, equitable
relief will be granted when such a vote is "rigged." For example,
when an amendment which benefits common stock at the expense of
preferred stock is adopted by a high percentage vote, the fact that two-
thirds of the preferred shareholders are also holders of common stock
weighs against utilization of the higher vote percentage as a factor in
favor of the amendment. This type of factual situation, however, if
recognized at the time the corporation is applying for a permit, would
probably cause the Department of Corporations to require a higher per-
centage vote from the preferred shareholders." The most recent case to
base its decision on this factor involved a corporation which had two
classes of shares; one publicly held, nonvoting class, and one privately
held, voting class. Amendments to the articles were adopted in which
both classes were exchanged for voting common stock, but since the pri-
vately held shares were surrendering their voting rights, they were given
a much more favorable exchange ratio than the publicly held shares."'
The court based its decision in part on the fact that although only ma-
jority approval by the class of stock adversely affected was required by
statute, 92.3 percent of the publicly held nonvoting shares were voted
for approval of the amendment, of which the majority owner of the pri-
vately held shares and members of his family owned only 20 percent.
The court concluded that "no fraud or inequitable conduct was resorted
to in consummating the amendment, and the proposed plan was fair,
equitable, and beneficial both to the nonvoting . . . stockholders and
to the corporation ....
It should be noted that at least one jurisdiction, New Jersey, which
is a strong "fairness test" jurisdiction, discounts obtaining a fixed
30. The Department's authority for imposing such a condition is derived from
California Corporations Code Section 25141. In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16
Del. Ch. 157, 192 A. 654 (Ct. Ch. 1928) the court noted the lack of any affiliation of the
90% holder of the adversely affected class of stock (who had voted in favor of the
amendment) with the other class of stock which would benefit by the amendment.
See also, Kennedy v. Carolina Public Service Co., 262 F. 803 (N.D. Ga. 1920), where
the court noted that a greater number of preferred shareholders were also common
shareholders; McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 646 (D. Md.
1939), aff'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940). See
also note 11 supra.
31. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir. 1962). The
privately held voting shares were exchanged for 1,000 new shares per share held; the
publicly held nonvoting shares were exchanged for one new share per share held.
32. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the corporation had
prospered through the years under the management of the owners of the privately held
shares, and that the premium received by the privately held shares seemed commensur-
ate with the benefit received by the corporation in having publicly held voting shares
(see discussion infra, regarding compensation to minority shareholders for rights to
be taken).
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percentage of the vote as a relevant factor.83 Further, in view of
management's natural superior powers in obtaining proxies, one author
regards this factor as irrelevant in determining fairness. 4  On the oth-
er side of the controversy, however, are Ballantine & Sterling who
state: "Mtlt would seem that if the amendment has received the requi-
site shareholder vote after a fair presentation of its effect, the Com-
missioner [of Corporations] should not substitute his judgment for that
of the shareholders."3 5 It is submitted that both positions may be too
extreme and that the voting percentage should be weighed in the bal-
ance with all other factors in reaching a decision on an amendment.
Available Alternative That Does Less Harm to Minority Shareholders
California now has at least two cases in which the availability of a
less inequitable alternative was used as a factor in striking down cor-
porate action taken by a majority of the shareholders.8 6 Furthermore,
a third California case indicates that if a less inequitable alternative
had been argued, the court would have considered it.37  On the other
hand, one court has held that it is not the function of the court to in-
quire into alternative plans.38  However, it is submitted that this fac-
tor has not received the attention it deserves in recapitalization cases"8 1
in that a close analysis of alternative plans would give the court or ad-
ministrative agency a greater insight into the ultimate fairness of the
amendment under consideration. For example, one of the most ex-
tensively litigated types of article amendments is that concerning elim-
ination of accrued dividend arrearages. To justify elimination of such
arrearages on equitable grounds, the courts have used the argument
that the corporation is in financial distress and it must free earnings
from the claims of the preferred shareholders before needed capital
33. Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200, 202 (Ct. Ch.
1943) ("If such a plan is inequitable to the extent that it shocks the conscience of
the court, this court then has the right as well as the duty to enjoin its consummation. It
is more a question of fair dealing between the strong and the weak than it is a question
of percentages or proportions of the votes favoring the plan.")
34. Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination,
29 VA. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1942).
35. H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 4, §295.
36. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 110, 113, 460 P.2d 464, 473,
475, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601, 603 (1969); Keller St. Dev. Co. v. Dep't of Invest-
ment, 227 Cal. App. 2d 760, 768, 39 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (1964) (affirming denial by
Commissioner of Corporations of permit where borrowing, as opposed to assessing
shares, appeared possible and corporate necessity was lacking).
37. Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d at 18, 85 P.2d at 584
(indicating that if some other plan for accomplishment of the objectives had been be-
fore the court, the court would have considered it).
38. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D. Md.
1939).
38a. One case has held it is not the function of the court to inquire into alter-
native plans. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 646 (D. Md.
1939).
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can be raised by the sale of additional common stock or securities con-
vertible into common stock. 9 Some writers have said that although
on its face such an argument has merit, they have discovered no case
where such financing has followed the recapitalization plan. 39a In addi-
tion, an alternative means of obtaining financing-long-term borrow-
ing for example-which would not be affected by the claim of the pre-
ferred shareholders to the accrued dividends may be available. In
other words, in this area of the law, the courts, and to some extent the
administrative agencies, have given greater weight to the first fairness
factor set forth above (corporate necessity) without looking to the pos-
sibility that an alternative plan could accomplish the desired result. Of
course, if a corporation could show that it was unable to obtain long-
term borrowing on reasonable terms and that it therefore had to resort
to the sale of equity securities or securities convertible into its equity
securities, then the court would be justified in giving much greater
weight to the corporate necessity than to the possibility of an alterna-
tive plan.
Compensation to Minority Shareholders for Rights to be Lost-
The "Compensatory Principle"
In justifying a recapitalization plan, counsel for the majority share-
holders and the corporation should be able to point to some factor
which compensates the minority shareholders for the rights they are re-
linquishing. The utilization of this factor requires an assessment of
the value of the rights lost and the value of what is given in return.4"
39. See Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 85 P. 2d 580
(1938); McNulty v. W.&J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 262 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 953 (3d Cir. 1943);
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 646 (D. Md. 1939),
affd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940) (convertible bonds).
39a. Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARv. L. REv. 780, 782-84
(1942); Note, Limitations on Alterations of Shareholders' Rights by Charter Amend-
ment, 69 Hv. L. REv. 538, n.42 (1956).
40. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 946, 952-53 (3d
Cir. 1943) (lost the right to accrued dividends; but the equity interest increased from
24% to 83%, thus giving control to the preferred stock); McQuillen v. National Cash
Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 646, 647 (D. Md. 1939) (lost the right to accrued divi-
dends but gained: an increased equity interest in the company; the permanent right
to vote for directors rather than simply having such a right in the event of default;
and the right to participate equally in dividends); Zobel v. American Locomotive Co.,
184 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (lost the right to accrued dividends
and voting control passed to the preferred stock; but nonredeemable shares were made
redeemable); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Ct.
Ch. 1943) (the preferred's accrued dividends were taken away, but voting control
passed to the preferred). Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del.
1944) (lost the liquidation preference but gained voting control); Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 202-04 (D. Del. 1943) (preferred stock already had
voting control, and even though the preferred was given an increased equity interest,
the court would have held the plan unfair because of the lack of compensation to the
preferred for loss of its right to accrued dividends, but the court was constrained to
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The courts sometimes give too great an emphasis to the second fair-
ness factor discussed above (disproportionate treatment of classes or
groups of shareholders) and forget the compensatory principle; on the
other hand, the courts sometimes give too great an emphasis to the com-
pensatory principle and forget the disproportionate treatment of
groups of shareholders. For example, all cases considering the issue rec-
ognize that there are equitable limitations on the power to reduce capi-
tal and to amend articles to accomplish this result. These "reduction
of capital" cases uniformly enunciate a rule that each shareholder must
be left with the same proportionate interest as others of his own or dif-
ferent classes of outstanding shares. However, defining what that pro-
portionate interest should be is very difficult. One court looked at it in
terms of proportionate interest in the assets of the corporation in the
event of liquidation; thus, in Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co.,41 since pre-
ferred shareholders had a liquidation preference, the common stock was
the only class of stock which had to be reduced.42 Another court looked
at the problem in terms of voting power; thus, even though the pre-
ferred stock had a liquidation preference, and even though (in accord-
ance with the dictates of Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co.) only the com-
mon stock was reduced, this action was held invalid because it reduced
the proportionate vote of the common stock. 43  The way to satisfy both
follow the Delaware "fraud" test and thus find it fair); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker,
403 111. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722, 731 (1949) (in upholding the fairness of the plan, the
court noted that the preferred shareholder owned the same number of common shares
and whatever he lost as a preferred shareholder he would gain as a common share-
holder); Starr v. Engineering Contracting Co., 149 Neb. 390, 31 N.W.2d 213 (1948)
(the court prevented the majority from amending the articles to increase the number
of common shares and convert their 90 preferred shares into 90 common shares-there
were only ten outstanding common shares of which six were owned by the majority-
thus increasing the majority's claim on dissolution from 60% to 96%, without any com-
pensating benefit being given to the holder of the four other common shares). Honig-
man v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962) (see notes 31-32 and accompa-
nying text supra).
41. 211 Mass. 424, 97 N.E. 1006 (1912).
42. In Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co., 211 Mass. 424, 97 N.E. 1006, 1007-08
(1912), a corporation required new capital or faced the danger of liquidation.
It had two classes of outstanding shares, 8,000 common and 2,000 six percent cum-
ulative preferred with a liquidation preference. It was proposed to adopt an amend-
ment to reduce the stated capital and in connection therewith to reduce the number
of authorized outstanding common shares to 1,000 leaving the preferred shares in-
tact, then to adopt an amendment increasing the authorized number of common
shares and give both classes on a pro rata basis the right to subscribe to it. The
court stated it would not have allowed the plan, but would have required the capital
reduction to be borne equally by both classes of stock, if the preference of the preferred
stock had been only as to dividends. But since the common could not participate
upon dissolution until the liquidation preference of the preferred was satisfied, and
since unless the amendment was adopted the corporation might be forced into liqui-
dation in any event, the court concluded the "contract" between the classes of share-
holders was that the common "assumed the burden" and therefore "must be first re-
sorted to even to the point of extinction before the preferred can be compelled to
contribute." The court, in effect, adopts the "absolute priority" theory in insolvency
reorganization. See 11 FLETcHER's CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRpORATIONS §5150 (1971).
43. See discussion of Page v. American & British Mfg. Co., at note 23 supra;
where although the preferred had a liquidation preference the court stated that the re-
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these cases is in effect to adopt the compensatory principle. For exam-
ple, the number of shares of common stock could be reduced because of
the liquidation preference of the preferred (thus giving the common
stock less of an interest on liquidation), but in order to maintain its
proportionate voting strength and to somewhat compensate it for the
reduction it could be given an increased vote (if necessary, by giving it
a greater number of votes per share). The "absolute priority" formula-
tion (common must first be resorted to where preferred has liquidation
preferences) is too rigid in that it treats the common shareholder as if
the corporation were being wound up, without giving any consideration
to the common shareholders' interest in the future of the enterprise as a
going concern. The compensatory principle removes attention from the
disproportionate treatment factor by compensating the common share-
holder for the rights that are being taken away from him.
4 4
Another approach to the compensatory principle is for a corporation
in adverse circumstances to utilize the various standards developed for
insolvency reorganizations when it desires to recapitalize in order to
insure fairness and appropriate compensation to all the classes con-
cerned. 4r The compensatory requirement is also considered by the
California Department of Corporations in its administrative review of
recapitalizations subject to its jurisdiction.
46
The foregoing discussion does not mean that all recapitalization
plans must contain a tangible compensatory element given to the share-
holders who are required to give up their rights. In some cases, the
value of the rights lost may be minimal so that other fairness factors
(such as a lack of discrimination among shareholders and corporate
necessity) may outweigh this factor. In other cases, such as a situa-
tion of greatly impaired capital, the minority may hold a class of stock
which has been reduced to "a shadow of equity" due to the liquidation
(or other) preferences of another class of stock. In such a case, a capi-
tal reduction which would take away some of the rights of the common
duction should have been borne equally by both classes. See also 11 FLETcHER'S CY-
CLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§5149, 5302 (1971).
44. See State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948) where a reclassification
plan calling for the conversion of preferred with accumulated dividend arrearages
to common at a favorable exchange ratio was found inequitable and enjoined where
the arrearages were twice the assets of the company so that the court thought the ex-
isting common stock was "worthless" and ordered it cancelled. Such treatment gives
no recognition to the compensatory principle.
45. See Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARv. L. REv. 780
(1942); Comment, A Standard of Fairness for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in
Corporate Recapitalizations, 33 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 97 (1965). See also Sander v. Janssen
Dairy Corp., 36 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.J. 1940) (reduction of junior class offset by giving
it prior dividend position).
46. Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California Recapitali-
zations, supra note 15, at 224.
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shareholder might be upheld without any specific compensatory bene-
fit to the common shareholders other than the general financial ad-
vantage of saving the enterprise.47 In other words, there may be cases
where the compensating element is simply the fact that the corporation
is now given the opportunity to raise new capital and proceed on its
course instead of commencing dissolution or receivership proceedings.
This is not the same as saying, however, that the corporate necessity
outweighs the compensatory principle under these circumstances.
Fair Disclosure to Shareholders
Fairness to shareholders in the disclosure of the plan to amend prior
to obtaining their vote of approval is a prerequisite to sustaining the
fairness of the action taken.48 This philosophy is carried out in Section
3637 of the California Corporations Code which provides that in con-
nection with obtaining the consent of the shareholders to an amend-
ment, the corporation must mail to each shareholder a concise summary
of the proposed amendment, the changes to be effected by the amend-
ment, and an indication of any resulting change in the rights of share-
holders. However, Section 3637 provides that the failure to comply
with it does not invalidate the amendment.49
Market Prices and Financial Analysis
Where more than one class of shares will be affected by an article
amendment and where such shares are traded upon the over-the-coun-
ter market or on a national securities exchange, their respective prices
may be a good indication of what investors think is the relative value
of the two classes of stock. If the exchange ratio is exactly proportion-
ate with the ratio of the prices, it may be easier to justify the amend-
ment plan. In addition, use of financial analysis tests (such as capital-
47. BALNIN.IIrn ON COPORATIONS §269 (Rev. ed. 1946).
48. See State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853, 857, 859 (Iowa 1948), where the
court held that the holders of the preferred were not "fully and fairly informed of the
nature, plan or of the probable effect upon the value of the stock held by them" of
the reclassification and further held it was "somewhat significant" that the manage-
ment proxy did not provide for voting against the amendment; Note, Corporations-
Fiduciary Duty of Directors-Amendments to Articles of Incorporation Ineffective
Without Adequate Disclosure to Shareholders, 47 IowA L. REv. 1110 (1962), discuss-
ing Berger v. Amana Society, 111 N.W.2d 753 (Iowa 1961). In California, the case
for this proposition is Transportation Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty, 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 607-
08, 169 P. 2d 470, 472-73 (1946), where the court noted the full disclosure made to
shareholders and a lack of objectors.
49. But see, 1.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was held to authorize either rescission or damages with respect
to a consummated merger authorized pursuant to a proxy statement alleged to contain
false and misleading information; Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment,
78 HARv. L. Rnv. 1146 (1965); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HAv. L.
Rnv. 1249, 1277 (1960).
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kzing projected earnings at an appropriate multiplier) may give the
court or administrative agency additional insight into whether the re-
capitalization is justified. By use of price ratio and financial analysis
tests, a Delaware court justified the reclassification into common stock
of a class of stock which previously had a liquidation preference, while
leaving other common stock outstanding. The court noted that the ex-
change ratio was exactly in proportion to the prices on the securities ex-
change and that, upon capitalizing the projected earnings at six per-
cent, the liquidation preference was not impaired and the common
stock was not under water; thus, the court held that there was no rea-
son to resort to elimination or reduction of the common stock in con-
nection with the recapitalization. In addition, turning to the compensa-
tory principle, the court noted that the class with the liquidation pref-
erence obtained voting control (78.7 percent) of the common shares."
Hindsight"1
In most cases a court or administrative proceeding will commence
before the adoption of an article amendment. However, where the
plan has already been put into effect, the successful continued opera-
tion of the enterprise as a consequence of the plan will weigh in favor
of its proponent.
52
EVALUATION OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
It is appropriate to ask whether review of article amendments on
equitable grounds is working adequately, or whether fairness demands
statutory revision to strengthen the minority shareholders' ability to
obtain adequate judicial or administrative review. Based upon a review
of applicable case law and certain administrative proceedings before the
Department of Corporations, and to a lesser extent upon the author's ex-
perience in this area, the system appears to be functioning adequately and
it seems that statutory revision is not necessary at this time. The most
recent California case in this area, Bixby v. Pidrno,5 5 tends to confirm
50. Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944).
51. Success since adoption of the plan.
52. Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18-19, 85 P.2d
580, 584-85. (1938) (continued corporation operations as a result of the plan instead
of liquidating, and started paying dividends). See also, Metzger v. George Washing-
ton Mem. Park, Inc., 380 Pa. 350, 110 A.2d 425 (1955), where preferred stock had
voting rights share-for-share with common in the event of default on four semi-an-
nual dividends-for ten years prior to the amendment there had been such a default;
the amendment gave the preferred the permanent right to vote share-for-share with
the common and was upheld by the court partly on the ground that the corporation
had been far more successful under the joint management of the preferred and com-
mon stock than under the management of the common stock alone.
53. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971). In reaching this con-
clusion, the author is cognizant that there are a number of exceptions from the qualifica-
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this conclusion. Evaluation of the fairness factors in that case reveals
that the decision was a very close one inded, but that the result is de-
fensible and probably correct.
In Bixby the majority of shareholders in a closely held corporation
desired to maintain continuity of management and ownership. The
problem the corporation desired to overcome was the sale of voting
stock to outsiders by the estates of decedent shareholders in order to
meet the cash needs of the estates.
The solution was to adopt an amendment to the articles by approval
of the holders of 70 percent of the outstanding shares, creating
a new class of nonvoting preferred stock having a large liquidation
preference, a $5 cumulative annual dividend and a $2 noncumulative
dividend per share. The new preferred shares were distributed pro
rata to the shareholders. In the event of a shareholder's death, his es-
tate could elect to sell the valuable preferred stock to pay the taxes and
costs, and retain the voting common stock for distribution to the
heirs.5"
A hearing on fairness was held before the Department of Corpora-
tions which granted a permit authorizing the plan. The hearing offi-
cer relied to a great extent on the corporate necessity factor and held
that this outweighed certain adverse effects of the plan. The hearing
officer also noted the size of the vote (70 percent) and the disclosure
provided by a proxy statement to all shareholders.5 5
The corporate necessity assertion in Bixby was that stability of own-
ership was required to assure continuity of management so that long-
term projects could be developed and implemented. This corporate
need appears to be no more compelling than that in Tu-Vu Drive-In
Corp. v. Ashkins,5 6 except to the extent that in Bixby long-term real
estate development projects existed which required continuity of man-
agement. It is difficult, however, to gauge the importance of this fac-
tor. One may argue that since the actual development would be per-
formed by outside builders, continuity of management of the real estate
tion requirements of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (see note 11
supra), so that many corporate recapitalizations are not subject to review by the De-
partment of Corporations and are subject only to review by the courts. It is believed
the California courts follow the method of judging the fairness of article amendments
set forth in this article, which appears to be similar to the method followed by the
Department of Corporations, so that in those few cases where an exempt recapitaliza-
tion in a California based transaction is unfair, sufficiently concerned California share-
holders should have an adequate remedy in California courts.
54. Id. at 135, 481 P.2d at 245, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
55. Bixby v. Volk, 78 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609 n.3 (Ct. App. 1969) (order for lim-
ited trial de novo on petition for mandamus vacated on hearing granted by supreme
court: Pierno substituted for Volk as Commissioner of Corporations).
56. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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owner would have no bearing on the success of development since
long-term contractual development commitments would be binding up-
on the present and future management of the owner-corporation. It
could be countered that a builder requires assurance of a continuous
flow of progress payments from a management he knows and trusts;
however, it is difficult to conceive of substantially long-term building
commitments under most circumstances (usual commitments for com-
merical or residential structures run from six months to three years)
unless the construction is of major proportions (e.g., development by
one builder of an entire city over a 20 year span). The case does not
disclose any such extraordinary long-term development activity. Ac-
cordingly, one may question whether the alternative presented by the
Tu-Vu decision-a simple right-of-first-refusal provision-would have
accomplished the desired result with less harm to the minority share-
holders than the solution adopted by the majority shareholders in Bixby
v. Pierno.
In attempting to answer this question it is important to note that in
Bixby the action taken treated all shareholders alike.57 A minority
shareholder's estate could pay its taxes without giving up voting inter-
est. Such a pro rata distribution of the preferred stock is akin to a pre-
emptive offering of a new class of shares and eliminates any discrim-
ination objections. s Further, the majority stockholders in the corpo-
ration owned 52 percent of the shares. Since 70 percent of the shares
were voted to approve the plan, at least 18 percent of the minority
shares were voted to approve it. It also appears that there were two
plaintiff objectors who did not hold all of the 30 percent which was
voted not to approve the plan and it is possible (although the case
does not make it clear) that the plaintiffs did not represent a majority
of the minority.
It is submitted that, although not precisely articulated in the deci-
sion of the hearing officer, in view of the less than compelling cor-
porate necessity or exigency as discussed above (and as contrasted to
Tu-Vu), the deciding factors were: (1) the fact that all shareholders
were treated alike, (2) the presumption that the 70 percent voting for
the amendment acted fairly,59 and (3) the fact that the alternative
adopted was not materially more onerous than any other available al-
ternative, e.g., a Tu-Vu right-of-first-refusal provision actually would
57. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d at 135, 481 P.2d at 245, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 237
("each shareholder will possess the same ownership interest, rights and privileges as he
formerly possessed").
58. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
59. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d at 148, 481 P.2d at 255, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 247
("the decision to adopt such a plan must derive initially from the sound business judg-
ment of the directors and the required majority of the shareholders").
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4
restrict free transferability (and therefore, liquidity) while the Bixby
plan appears to facilitate liquidity and free transferability of the share-
holder's interest.
The minority shareholders obtained judicial review of the decision
of the Department of Corporations by asking for a limited trial de novo
(independent judgment review) by the court of the evidence relating
to the matter. The court of appeals granted a de novo review on the
ground that a vested interest of the shareholders was affected, name-
ly, the plaintiffs had shown: (a) the combined value of their com-
mon plus preferred stock was less than the value of the common stock
alone, and (b) there was a possibility of adverse tax consequences as a
result of distribution of preferred stock.60 The California Supreme
Court gave the Department of Corporations an important victory by
holding that a de novo review of its decisions on recapitalizations was
not required, and that the Department's decisions should be reversed
only if its findings were not supported by substantial evidence or were
arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent. The supreme court determined
that the Commissioner of Corporations was entitled to conclude that
the advantages outweighed the adverse effects (i.e., the rights lost as a
result) of the plan. 61 This decision appears to prevent complete reliti-
gation before the courts of recapitalization matters subject to the juris-
diction of the Department of Corporations. Certainly one of the pur-
poses of an administrative review is to remove such issues from over-
burdened courts and place them into the hands of an agency which has
acquired expertise in dealing with these matters on a day-to-day basis,
thereby leaving for judicial review cases in which the decision of the
Department is not supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
By a conscious use of the fairness factors discussed above, the
courts, administrative agencies, and courts called upon to review an
administrative agency's decisions, may reach equitable results based
upon grounds which are more acceptable to litigants than the obsolete
''vested rights" formulations and decisions which were based upon undue
concentration on one factor without weighing it against other factors.
The above list does not purport to be complete. However, it is hoped
that it will channel attention to those factors which make a substantive
difference in the area of fairness of article amendments to shareholders.
60. Bixby v. Volk, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 609, 611.
61. Bixby v. Piemo, 4 Cal. 3d at 150, 151, 481 P.2d at 256, 257, 93 Cal. Rptr. at
248, 249.
